ANRE has launched a public consultation on a draft regulation that reshapes how new power plants and storage assets connect to Moldova’s electricity grids. The timing is not accidental. Developers have started to treat the grid connection point as an asset in its own right, because capacity constraints and long queues can decide whether a project reaches financial close or stays on paper. The draft tries to move the market away from opaque, sequential steps and toward a framework that relies on recurring public data, fixed procedural timelines, technical alternatives, and competitive allocation when capacity turns scarce.

At the centre of the proposal sit two mechanisms that can materially alter project strategy and project finance in renewables and storage. First, ANRE would allow capacity in the transmission grid to be allocated via competitive auctions, with a defined annual calendar and rule set. Second, ANRE would formalise “flexible connection” as a legitimate route to grid access, based on explicit consent from the project owner to accept temporary limitation or suspension of grid services when the system faces overload conditions.

Auctions: when grid capacity becomes a scarce resource with a price signal

The draft makes auctions a primary tool for allocating transmission-level connection capacity that becomes available either because earlier connection permits were not used or because the transmission system operator completed grid development works. In practical terms, it introduces a structured market signal for access in constrained zones, rather than a process that depends only on queue position.

The annual auction would take place by 31 March, for each transmission zone that has available capacity, and it would cover all available capacity in that zone, including newly created capacity and capacity freed up by cancellation or non-realisation of previously issued connection permits. Any capacity that appears between two annual auctions would roll into the next auction, and any capacity that remains unallocated would automatically transfer to the next annual auction. If at least 20 MW of new capacity appears in the transmission grid, the system operator would have the option to organise additional auctions during the year.

The pricing logic is designed to be auditable and, at the same time, to deter purely speculative applications. The draft sets a starting price at 20% of a specific value tied to the performance guarantee framework (with reference to ANRE Decision No. 277/2025). If the total capacity requested through bids stays at or below the capacity on offer, all participants receive capacity free of charge. If bids exceed the available capacity, allocation goes to those who offer the highest price. The draft also states that revenues from auctions should support grid development.

For investors, this is a clear pivot. In congested areas, grid access moves closer to a competitive mechanism with a transparent incremental cost. Developers will likely rework origination rules and site selection, because the cheapest land may no longer secure the cheapest path to grid. Project budgets will also need a new line item: a capacity acquisition cost that depends on local scarcity and competitive behaviour, not only on technical connection works.

Flexible connection: faster access, with operational constraints written into the deal

Flexible connection is the second “big lever” in the draft. The concept rests on an explicit agreement between the system user and the system operator. The project owner accepts that the operator may limit or suspend the provision of transmission or distribution services when overload conditions occur. The draft frames those flexible conditions as predictable, with parameters set in the agreement between the user and the operator.

For a developer arriving in Moldova with a solar, wind, or storage project that needs a connection permit, the practical meaning is straightforward. A project can reach a connection decision faster in a constrained zone, but it must sign up to curtailment risk. The operator will require confirmation that the asset can operate under scheduled or event-driven limitations, and that the project accepts those limitations contractually. In business terms, flexible connection exchanges part of the “firmness” of grid access for speed and a higher probability of securing a connection pathway.

This has technical consequences that go well beyond paperwork. The project’s energy yield model must incorporate curtailment scenarios, because limitation events often coincide with high renewable output periods, local congestion, and stressed grid states. Storage projects may see a differentiated risk profile, because flexibility can affect both charging windows and injection windows, depending on local constraints and operator rules.

A parallel market risk, and why ANRE pushes for “use-it-or-lose-it” discipline

The draft lands in a context where Moldova has already seen a parallel, unregulated market for connection permits. The documents explicitly describe a situation where entities that obtained permits at no cost later commercialised them, while grid access for developers with real build intent faced artificial blockage.

Auctions and flexible connection both respond to this market distortion, but in different ways. Auctions provide a formal channel for scarce capacity, with a clear allocation rule and an economic signal. Flexible connection increases the usable capacity of existing networks through controlled operational constraints, which can unlock part of the queue without immediate full-scale reinforcements.

Process discipline: short checks, defined timelines, and less room for “silent delays”

The draft also tightens procedural timelines in a way that matters to development schedules. The system operator would have three business days to verify whether the application pack is complete and, if not, to request missing documents exhaustively. If the applicant does not provide the requested documents within three business days from notification, the operator rejects the application, while preserving the right to reapply with a complete set. For connection permits, the draft sets indicative timelines of 15 days for a final consumer connecting to the transmission network, 10 days for a final consumer connecting to distribution, and 30 days for generation and storage projects.

These timelines do not remove technical constraints, but they reduce execution risk that comes from process uncertainty. In bank terms, they support tighter critical-path planning and clearer conditions precedent.

What developers and investors should expect after adoption

If ANRE adopts the regulation broadly in this form, it will likely change how projects compete, how they price risk, and how they structure contracts. Auctions will push developers to quantify the value of speed and location. Flexible connection will push lenders and offtakers to ask more detailed questions about curtailment, grid constraints, and the project’s ability to perform under limitation regimes.

The draft also signals a clear implementation horizon, with effects expected to start quickly once the new framework comes into force, and with an explicit expectation of application from 2026.

In short, Moldova’s grid access debate moves from “who gets in line first” to “who can quantify and carry grid risk best”. Auctions formalise scarcity. Flexible connection formalises curtailment as a tool for system efficiency. Together, they can accelerate part of the pipeline, but they also force projects to show discipline on economics, contracts, and technical readiness.